

# BEYOND POSITIVISM: LEARNING FROM CONTEXTUAL INTEGRATED STRATEGIES

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*Good criminologists are interpretively flexible, searching to read situations from the different angles illuminated by multiple theories. Plural understandings of a crime problem stimulate a disparate range of action possibilities that can be integrated into a hedged, mutually reinforcing package of preventive policies. Positivist criminology has its uses in informing the kind of research-policy interface advanced. Its limitation is that it focuses on short-term, decontextualized policies that are intentionally disentangled from integrated policy packages. This when it is long-term, dynamically responsive, and contextualized, integrated assaults that are more likely to bear fruit. Some suggestions are made on how to reform criminology so that its creative and evaluative focus is more directed at what Bateson in 1972 called "systemic wisdom." The alternative is to settle for a positivism that almost inevitably leads to a policy analysis of despair about the intractability of the crime problem. That "nothing works" is not an empirically established fact, but an artifact of the epistemology of a science with a particular structure. This structure can be reformed.*

Imagine for a moment that another applied scholarly discipline—international relations—were run like criminology.<sup>1</sup> The core activity of the field would then involve regressions where variables like the size of nations' armies and arsenals were used to predict which nations were more likely to end up in wars; regressions in which aspects of the personality and structural location (gender, class, etc.) of national leaders were used to predict propensity to lead their nations into violence; tests of strain theories of violence (Will the Russians become less prone to violence if they have bread in their stomachs?); experiments in which the effects of functional equivalents to street lighting, such as satellite monitoring to make missile movements visible, were monitored. Of course, the discipline of international relations is nothing like this.<sup>2</sup> If it were, then my prediction is that the predominant view in the discipline would be that "nothing works." Most studies would

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find no significant effects in preventing war of deterrence by large armies, personality and structural characteristics of national leaders, strain variables, or deployment of new prevention technologies. Because of the discipline's nihilism, political leaders would take little notice of it.

Why do I predict a nothing works nihilism, scientific surrender before the dreadful challenge of preventing war, were international relations to go the way of criminology? Well, for the same reason that we have produced a nihilistic scientific culture from the dogged positivism of criminology, a nihilism reinforced by the critical legal studies, Marxist, and postmodern critics of the mainstream tradition (Handler 1992). Positivism produces an avalanche of nonsignificant findings, even in a system of scientific production that is biased in favor of highlighting significant effects, because specificity of context is overwhelmingly important in deciding whether a crime will occur or a war will break out. Even positivist theories that are empirically robust in terms of certain kinds of static tests will generally fail to predict effective intervention because they will not be sufficiently dynamic to cope with the way context unfolds in specific instances.

If this kind of positivist science is not the mainstream of international relations, then what is its "classical approach" (Bull 1966)? It is, I would suggest, to analyze integrated policy packages as they operate in the context of a particular period of history—to analyze, for example, the successes and failures of the Reagan administration's foreign policy with the Soviet Union and to learn from that history. Four departures from criminology's positivist model are involved here: (a) focus on integrated policy packages; (b) contextual analysis; (c) eschewing static models in favor of dynamic "thinking in time" (Neustadt and May 1986); and (d) intertwining rather than separating normative theories (about what ought to be) and explanatory theories (about what is).

I do not want to suggest that international relations has got it right and we got it wrong. Clearly, the kind of science we need for understanding crime is rather different from what is required to understand international relations. I have used the other discipline simply as a device to open our eyes to the fact that there are radically different ways of organizing our science. Now I will develop a brief case for a different scientific model for criminology. First, I will suggest what might be the role of theory in informing context-specific integrated policy packages. Second, I will advocate what I see as a more marginal, but still important, role for the type of positivist criminology that is currently the mainstream of the discipline. Third, I will find virtue in a more internationalized culture of evaluation that nurtures thinking in time and thinking across cultures about the contextual successes and failures of integrated policy packages.

### *THEORY AND INTEGRATED STRATEGIES*

Theory matters. But I don't think it matters in the way that positivist criminology would have it. The positivist vision about which I am doubtful is of theory constructed from a set of eternally true propositional building blocks, each supported by a substantial body of empirical evidence. This vision is limited because truth changes over time and truth about humans is changed by the fact of humans discovering it to be true.<sup>3</sup> At the end of several decades of hard work confirming all the building blocks of a theory, some of the building blocks that were verified early on will have become no longer true. Because positivist science progresses slowly, it never delivers anything better than theoretical structures that are half true, half crumbling, as more and more older blocks fall out of place. This is the lesson we should have learned from the history of positivist economics.

The important way I think we should use theory is metaphorically. Competing theories supply us with competing ways of imagining how to construct integrated policy packages. Let me give you a practical example of the constructive, commonsense use of theory in developing integrated strategies for dealing with a contextually conceived problem. Sydney in the 1980s had a motor vehicle theft rate that was very high by any world standard. The New South Wales Police responded by calling together the key players for a roundtable discussion that came to be known during the early 1990s as the "Motor Vehicle Theft Forum." It included senior police, motor vehicle manufacturers, insurers, media organizations and the Motor Traders' Association (representing vehicle sellers). The police also sent some staff out to the streets and correctional institutions to talk to young people who stole cars. The latter feedback was viewed using an opportunity theory metaphor. These young offenders were often unemployed, facing long-term unemployment, from impoverished neighborhoods (blocked legitimate opportunities). Their illegitimate opportunities to steal cars were constituted in part by white-collar criminals in the used-car trade, who used computerized lists of parts (or whole cars) that had been ordered by customers to supply juveniles with written lists of car models for which they would pay. Opportunity theory provided a way of understanding the social context of these unusually high car-theft rates, and it supplied policy implications. It motivated a search for ways of reforming juvenile justice that might give young people more hope for the future (see Juvenile Justice Advisory Council of NSW 1993). It led to the comprehension that some of the enforcement effort should be directed to the white-collar criminals who constitute the illegitimate opportunity structure for car theft.

The theory of moral hazard was also an important metaphor, though the participants hardly spoke of it in such high-flown terms. Insurance companies

had been happy to take (higher) insurance premiums that valued cars well beyond their worth. The New South Wales practice was to insure on "agreed value" rather than "market value." This did engender a temptation to leave cars so that it was easy for them to be stolen (or to actively arrange for them to be stolen) when owners wanted to deal with a financial problem by cashing out their overinsured asset. The preventive remedy here was the insurance companies' undertaking to move the industry away from agreed value toward market value.

Finally, some simple crime prevention theory (Clarke 1993) was instructive. The marking of car engines with compliance plates and engine numbers was supposed to prevent theft by aiding traceability. But the context of the Sydney car-theft market was one where cars were being stolen substantially for parts that were not marked. So the vehicle manufacturers agreed at the roundtable discussion to move to individual marking of separate salable parts. In addition to the opportunity, crime prevention, and moral-hazard theories that illuminate the policy choices in this context, the whole process of the roundtable problem solving was explicitly motivated by the theoretical metaphor of "community policing," to which the New South Wales police hierarchy had been converted several years earlier. The total policy package may have worked. By mid-1992, the number of motor vehicle thefts in New South Wales had dropped by one third, compared with the level prevailing during 1990 (Police Board of New South Wales 1992, p. 25).

The metaphors of criminological theory do get translated into the commonsense thinking of police practitioners. I am regularly surprised at how often I even discover my own (not-so-straightforward) metaphor of reintegrative shaming being imaginatively applied by Australian police. This makes me increasingly suspicious that I got the idea from them more than they got it from me. Criminology is like that: theory plagiarizes and reconceptualizes the common sense of practitioners. The implication of this is that accomplishing the level of theoretical literacy required to make the strategy advanced in this article work is not as difficult as it might seem.

The positivist priority of discovering which of a number of competing theories explains more variance does not seem centrally important to me. What is important is that criminology develop a range of theories that are sometimes useful. Practitioners can then scan through the list of useful theories to see which supplies a revealing metaphor in the particular problem context. Naturally, this will often be different theories from the ones the positivists say explain most variance across sets of decontextualized cases. In the world of problem solving that matters, it is contextualized usefulness that counts, not decontextualized statistical power.

Usually, as in the Sydney car-theft problem solving, there will be multiple competing theories that supply useful interpretive metaphors. The crime is, at the same time, a seizing of an illegitimate opportunity, a response to blocked legitimate opportunity, taking advantage of a moral hazard, an assertion of macho independence, and so on. The art (rather than the science) of applied criminology is the gift of being able to perceive multiple theoretical significances in a practical problem, thus bringing the practitioner to a nuanced understanding of the problem. This nuanced understanding, seeing the problem in many ways at once, seeing it through different theoretical prisms, enables an integrated strategy of problem solving.

### *REENTER POSITIVIST CRIMINOLOGY*

Traditional positivist criminology has an extremely important prior role in this process. This is, first, the role of demonstrating which theories are nonsense. Many theories tend to consistent irrelevance or to revealing more falsity than truth. In other words, we should want the discipline to help limit the number of theories scanned by practitioners to theories that explain significant amounts of variance a fair proportion of the time. Positivist criminology can help by locating which theories have some partial explanatory power some of the time and which theories are best not to clutter our thinking because they rarely explain anything. Of course, even prior to this empirical sifting, there is a need to weed out theories that are logically incoherent, based on concepts that cannot be identified in the world, or infertile (making no new predictions that other, better theories have not already made).

Second, for an applied discipline like criminology, positivist methods have the crucial role of testing key policy claims of the theory. But in light of what I said earlier about the limits of positivist testing of a policy across a large number of decontextualized cases, I want to reformulate the role for positivist science so it serves those concerned to find integrated, contextualized policy packages. Consider demand-reduction theories of drug control as alternatives to supply reduction through criminal enforcement.<sup>4</sup> Within the narrow ahistoricism of positivist social science, researchers wax pessimistic about the impact of drug education programs of very short duration because of the rather small or insignificant preventive effects they secure (Ogborne 1988; Wragg 1987, 1990). But surely any credible demand-side strategy must be integrated and long term? It stretches credibility to hope that an education program run for young people over days or weeks could overwhelm influences mediated by peers with whom they interact for many hours every day, by adult role models they see daily, and by a continuous barrage of media

influences. The credible integrated strategy here involves political and social movement leadership to transform the culture, in the long haul, away from a drug use culture, away from a hard-drinking culture in which smoking is a symbol of adulthood, a culture wherein a little pill can be found for every ill. This means an integrated long-term strategy to move toward a society whose citizens just don't want to solve their problems through drugs. Some societies, of course, are already somewhat like this; not all societies have drug problems like those of the United States. The historical record shows that such transformation need not be pie in the sky. In Australia, a long period of sharply falling alcohol consumption from the mid-19th century corresponds with the rise of the temperance movement, and the long rise in consumption from the 1930s to the 1970s corresponds with the decline and virtual demise of the old temperance movement (cf. Powell 1988). This decline of the temperance movement occurred after its international leadership in the United States made the tactical mistake of supporting prohibition, a supply-side addition to their demand-reduction strategy, which disintegrated and discredited their total policy package.

In the context of aspiring to change via long historical struggles in which social movements and states seek to transform cultural attitudes toward drugs, what is the relevance of piecemeal, necessarily short-term, positive evaluation of drug education programs? There is a relevance, I think. The long-term reformer should not be discouraged by nihilistic positivists who summarize short-term evaluation literatures with the conclusion that most of these things make no difference most of the time. But one should definitely be discouraged in one's support for a particular element of an integrated long-term strategy if all the evaluation studies show that in the short term, this element never makes any significant difference. One would be wise to be in the business of only supporting elements of a policy package that have some empirical basis of support from the positivist evaluation literature. But one should not become a nothing works nihilist in the face of some short-term interventions being found to have no significant effect whereas others do. One will take heart from the fact that a short-term intervention can sometimes effect change when the theory is that only long and deep cultural change will turn the problem around. One will delve into the positivist studies to grasp what clues they can offer about the contexts for success versus failure for which we might watch in the process of contextual implementation.

In summary, positivist criminology can do two things for us. First, it can rule out certain theories as making consistently unsupportable claims. Second, it can tell us which interventions sometimes show evidence of working, even if they do not always work. It will never deliver us a unified explanatory edifice that is any more than a very partial, crude, and flawed explanation of the world.

*INTEGRATED, CONTEXTUAL,  
DYNAMIC IMPLEMENTATION*

Let me now illustrate the scientific process I have in mind with deterrence theory. Empirical tests of deterrence theories lead most criminologists to the conclusion that deterrence theories have relatively weak explanatory power (see, for example, the reviews in Zimring and Hawkins 1973; Gibbs 1975; Blumstein, Cohen, and Nagin 1978; Tittle 1980; Roth, Scholz, and Witte 1989). Moreover, specific interventions in policy to increase deterrence mostly, though not invariably, fail to reduce crime. Consistent with the analysis I have outlined above, we should not react to this literature as nothing works nihilists about deterrent interventions. I take the (mostly negative) literature to show that deterrence can have an effect, but that the positivist literature has not revealed a lot about the contexts in which this is true and the contexts in which it is not. The literature does give a few limited clues, for example, about the greater contextual significance of informal as opposed to formal controls (Burkett and Jensen 1975; Kraut 1975; Anderson, Chiricos, and Waldo 1977; Meier and Johnson 1977; Jensen and Erickson 1978; Akers, Krohn, Lanza-Kaduce, and Radosevich 1979; Tittle 1980; Meier 1982; Paternoster, Saltzman, Waldo, & Chiricos 1983a, 1983b; Bishop 1984; Williams 1985; Paternoster and Iovanni 1986; Paternoster 1989; Nagin and Paternoster 1991; Grasmick, Bursik, and Kinsey 1991; Grasmick, Bursik, and Arneklev 1993; but see Piliavin, Gartner, Thornton, and Matsueda 1986; Williams and Hawkins 1989; Simpson 1992) and about contexts in which deterrent threats can foster defiance (Sherman 1992) or stigmatization (Makkai and Braithwaite 1993) that actually increase crime.

What I am concluding is that, weak as it is, there is enough positivist support for deterrence to take it seriously as a theoretical option to scan during the design of an integrated strategy for dealing with a particular crime problem. More provocatively, I want to reject nihilist positivism even more strongly by saying that even if a positivist test of deterrence theory fails to support it with regard to that particular crime problem, deterrence is still a theory the policy analyst should be scanning in designing an integrated policy strategy. Toni Makkai, Valerie Braithwaite, Diane Gibson, Anne Jenkins, David Ermann, and I have been involved with just such a problem in our research on compliance with quality of care standards by Australian nursing homes. Our positivist research shows that perceptual deterrence models do not explain compliance (Braithwaite and Makkai 1991; Makkai and Braithwaite 1993). Yet the careful in-context fieldwork we have done observing regulatory encounters shows that the across-context regressions obscure many dynamic contexts where deterrent threats have moments of

considerable force and others where deterrent threats get managers' backs up, hardening determination to resist.

The regression findings imply that it surely would be folly to seek to improve compliance with nursing home laws based on a purely deterrent strategy. Equally, the qualitative research suggests designing an integrated strategy for improving compliance that includes discretion to swing in with deterrent threats when this is contextually appropriate and to deliver on the threats when this is needed. As consultants, what we have done for the Australian government is design such an integrated strategy (Braithwaite, Makkai, Braithwaite, and Gibson 1993). It is a dynamic approach that seeks to avert most of the counterproductive contexts for deterrent threats by always trying persuasion, appeals to professionalism, and caring for the patients as first strategies. If this continues to fail, nursing homes are banned from admitting new residents until they can show that they are capable of acceptable care for them and so that they can concentrate all their energies on putting things right for the residents they already have. Although this is presented as a protective, preventive measure, it also has clear deterrent implications, which can be communicated without the kind of threat that incurs resistance. When this fails, escalation of deterrent threats right up to the ultimate incapacitative measure of corporate capital punishment (closing the home) is mobilized when social control fails at each lower level of an enforcement pyramid. The theory of such a dynamic enforcement pyramid has been outlined in more detail elsewhere (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). Therein deterrence is integrated into a strategy that tries persuasion first, then deterrence when that fails, then incapacitation when deterrence fails.

One problem with deterrence theory in criminology has been that it has tended to be limited to what the international relations theorists call passive deterrence, neglecting the possibility that when passive deterrence initially fails, more active kinds of deterrence based on graduated escalation might yet succeed (Schelling 1966, p. 78). Whether deterrence is working in a particular context is not something one assumes on the basis of prior positivist research; it is something one discovers by observing specific reactions during regulatory encounters.

The key ideas here are therefore to move on from (a) accepting deterrence as a theory that can be relevant in some contexts but not others to (b) designing an integrated strategy in which deterrence finds a place that is contingent on its contextual relevance, where (c) that strategy is dynamic and responsive to how the players of an unfolding crime control game react to events as they occur.



*TOWARD A MORE PRODUCTIVE  
CULTURE OF EVALUATION*

It follows that the most useful kind of evaluation research focuses on entire integrated strategies evaluated in a stream of time. Quantitative skills in interrupted time series analysis can be relevant to this kind of evaluation, assessing changes in levels of crime that occur as different elements of a package swing into action in different ways during a history of interventions. At least equally relevant, however, are the skills of the historian and of the qualitative fieldworker. The historian, unlike the positivist, sees the future as requiring a different explanatory frame from the past, always flowing in a stream of time from the past, where the past has predictive value of sorts, but where that predictive value is compromised by the way time always changes context.

This historical attitude has it that the situation evaluated in a previous positivist study may be analogous, but that analogies are dangerous in learning the lessons of any history, including the history of criminological research. So the evaluator with an historical attitude always asks both how is this situation different and how is it similar to the one studied in the positivist research. It will always be different in time and place and almost always in nation if one is a non-U.S. criminologist. Concomitantly, there will be major cultural differences in the people involved.

Criminologists interested in making policy prescriptions in a particular sociohistorical context must get their hands dirty—go out and talk to the people involved, observe them doing their job, so that they can appreciate the way differences in time, place, and culture matter. The evaluator of an integrated solution should do the same. Then the evaluator can write a rich report on what was special about this context, particularly if it is one where a dramatic success or an unexpected failure occurs. This, in turn, enables other criminologists to discern how such a dramatic success or failure is different and similar to the implementation context they confront.

My advocacy is of rich, detailed descriptions of integrated strategies, especially where the integrated strategies would seem to have been successful. This is crucial to my remedy for nothing works nihilism. We should be looking for criminological equivalents to international relations classics like Allison's 1971 book on the Cuban missile crisis.<sup>5</sup>

I am amazed at some of the obvious success stories of integrated social control strategies that have been completely ignored by researchers. Millions of dollars are spent on researching drug control, but no one in Australia has fully studied the integrated strategy used to deal with what was, apart from alcohol and tobacco, the biggest drug problem of my parents' generation, a

drug to which both my parents at one time were addicted and which killed my aunt. This drug was a combination of phenacetin, aspirin, and a megadose of caffeine (over-the-counter brandnames Bex and Vincents). It was marketed particularly aggressively on radio and television during the 1950s to mothers as a pick-me-up to deal with the stresses of family life.<sup>6</sup> Why is this integrated strategy worth studying? Because it was completely successful. You cannot buy this drug in Australia today and, as far as I know, there are no addicts left, though many ended their addiction through death. The police were not key actors in this integrated drug control strategy. The key actors were a social movement against the drug led by the Australian Kidney Foundation, certain specialist colleges of the medical profession, certain journalists who campaigned against the drug, and health regulators who eventually banned advertising and negotiated agreements with the manufacturers to withdraw the product from the market in a way that gave them time to diversify into safer drugs. You can actually still buy Bex and Vincents in Australia, but the addictive and destructive phenacetin-aspirin-caffeine combination has long been removed from their formulations.

Progress in learning how to better control the problems we call crime will come through studies of such integrated strategies, which combine analyses of quantitative outcomes, historical methods, and interview-based fieldwork. In every country, I suspect such success stories are to be found. But like the Bex and Vincents campaign, like the Sydney car-theft campaign, like cleaning up the Australian nursing home industry (Braithwaite et al. 1993), like the current campaign against insurance industry fraud in Australia (Fisse and Braithwaite forthcoming; Braithwaite 1993), criminal enforcement is often not one of the most important ingredients in an integrated strategy that reduces crime. In other integrated strategies, like the successful efforts against drunk driving in Australia during the past decade (Homel 1988), criminal enforcement has been central within an integrated strategy. Homel's book on drunk driving is close to the kind of evaluation I am advocating here, though I would have liked more historical and qualitative work on the social movement and informal drinking-group contributions to the success story.

Maximum benefit will flow from this kind of transformation of criminology if the process of learning becomes more internationalized. There is no more barren view than that you only need attend to research findings from your own country because results from other lands will not translate at home. My story is that results from your own country don't translate either: they are best viewed as analogies that demand systematic listing of differences and similarities to the sociohistorical context in which you propose to use the findings. There is virtue, not fault, in opening our horizons to integrated strategies that work in contexts that are massively different. This is precisely

how leaps of inductive insight relevant to here-and-now contexts occur. Horizon-broadening difference opens up our policy imaginations to new ways of fashioning interventions, ways rather different from anything that has ever been done anywhere else before.

### *AN INTEGRATED STRATEGY FOR REFORMING CRIMINOLOGY*

A summary of where we have gotten so far is that the best chance of fashioning an intervention to deal with a crime problem arises when:

1. The policymaker has a commonsense grasp of how to use good criminological theories as metaphors, usually applying multiple theoretical metaphors, arriving at a nuanced understanding of the crime problem by seeing it as many things at once.
2. The policymaker reads literature reviews on the results of the best positivist research. This reading enables the policymaker to drop some theories off the list of those scanned under point 1. It gives one clues on what kinds of interventions can work some of the time, even if not most of the time.
3. The policymaker engages with the people living and working in the context in which one wishes to intervene. The qualitative understanding one gets from talking with these people enables a listing of the ways this context is different from and similar to the contexts in which successful interventions (point 2) have been previously applied, based on the common theoretical relevance (point 1) one apprehends in the context.
4. One designs (with stakeholders) an integrated strategy that is redundantly responsive to the theoretical relevances one sees in point 1, the positivist findings one understands in point 2, and the contextual differences one discerns in point 3. One has acquired wisdom in the design of integrated strategies by reading the histories and evaluations of integrated strategies in point 5.
5. Where it seems there might be lessons from the implementation of the integrated strategy, the policymaker writes down the history of the strategy's discovery and unfolding, the outcome data at different points of this unfolding, and the perceptions of key players at different points during the implementation dynamic. This enables professional researchers to come in and do different kinds of evaluations of the entire integrated strategy process.

Perhaps this seems a demanding set of expectations of policymakers. This is only true if we view policymakers as individuals in the abstracted way I have found it convenient to present them. For civic republicans like me, policy-making is a communal process of dialogue, wherein different mem-

bers of a policy-making community can be relied on for different kinds of knowledge, insight, and creativity.

So what is the integrated reform agenda for criminology that follows from opting for this approach to fashioning integrated strategies to crime problems? It is:

1. Take criminological theory more seriously. Don't have the view that theory is a waste of time because it does not deliver master explanations that account for massive proportions of variance. Theories that are wrong most of the time can be extremely useful. Don't be shy about theory of very general sweep. The more general the theory, the more likely it is to be worth keeping on the list of theories that merit scanning by policy practitioners.
2. Put positivist criminology in its place. Reject the prescriptions of the critical theorists and postmodernists who want to write off positivist criminology.<sup>7</sup> Nurture in particular the most rigorous positivist criminology, such as random-allocation policy experiments and big cohort studies. But reject the view that the ultimate value in science is discovering that single unified set of law-like statements that offers the best explanation of the phenomenon.
3. Nurture the contextual art of identifying similarities and differences from other contexts where important research discoveries have occurred. Nurture historical criminology. Nurture a cross-cultural criminology of discovery and diagnosis of past and present successful integrated crime control strategies from around the world.
4. Shift research resources to policymaker-researcher teams who design long-term integrated strategies and who then undertake a combination of historical, qualitative fieldwork and quantitative evaluations across the (long) time span of these multifaceted assaults on the problem.
5. Give the design of integrated dynamic strategies a greater status in criminology than the design of static explanatory theories.

What I am describing here is a very different set of scientific practices from contemporary criminology. The latter I see as consisting of three main groups of practitioners who essentially spin the field in circles. One group is a small class of explanatory theorists of crime; the second is a large class of positivist researchers who test the static explanatory models generated by the first group or who just do atheoretical description; the third group is a rabble of critical theorists peddling a plethora of mutually incompatible critiques, but unified in their desire to tear down the more conservative contributions coming from the first two groups. Of course, there are anthropologists, historians, and a good number of other misfits who don't squeeze into any of these groups. But in the broad, the discipline does not go anywhere worth going because the first group develops static theories that the second group endlessly, repetitively discovers to be mostly not true. The third group

(without offering much in the way of an alternative) endlessly and repetitively critiques the first two for bothering with their whole enterprise. From the ashes of this cycle of theory, refutation, and derision, every now and then a new theorist manages to dress up in new clothes an old theory that was demolished in some previous cycle of destruction. And the wheel turns again. My critique is that the first two groups are entrapped in a scientific culture that persists with a pretense (that most of the participants know to be a delusion) of the pursuit of a single unified set of law-like statements that offers the best explanation of the phenomenon. My enterprise has been to give these two groups a more useful role (see points 1 and 2 above) in a criminology that moves forward to making a contribution to reducing crime instead of moving in circles.

I have said very little about the third group. They have an absolutely important role that begins with note 1 to the first sentence of this article. Critical theorists keep us all on our toes with regard to our presuppositions. What is this crime that is worth preventing? When is defiance of the state something to be nurtured rather than crushed? Whose interests are being served by this reform process we are being offered? Why even talk of this social problem as crime? The latter is often the most important question to ask. My theoretical bias is that the most important crime control accomplishments of integrated strategies flow from those parts of the strategies that react to crime rather than in the way that abolitionists would have it—as troubles, problems of living, mistakes, conflicts—as matters for dialogue. Those of us who are republicans and intellectual pluralists truly do believe that it is good for us to be regularly smitten by these kinds of critiques. Hence I want a criminology wherein the scholarship and praxis of those who work on each of my five agenda items are continually under attack from critical theorists. Indeed, sometimes I would want to join in on these attacks. The blood sport of critique is both socially productive and a good recreational activity for those of us who normally toil at the more frustrating and compromising work of reform. But I would also like to tempt some critical theorists to have a go at developing contextual, integrated strategies of dynamic intervention. If nothing else, the experience would make them better critics.

### *CONCLUSION*

In other publications with various colleagues, I have begun to set down in more detail what dynamic integrated strategies might look like to deal with occupational health and safety violations in Australia (Braithwaite and Grabosky 1985; Braithwaite, Grabosky, and Fisse 1986), Australian nursing home regulation (Braithwaite et al. 1993), Australian antitrust and consumer

protection (Fisse and Braithwaite 1993; Braithwaite 1993), domestic violence and rape (Braithwaite and Daly forthcoming), and Australian juvenile justice (Braithwaite and Mugford forthcoming). In this article, I have made all too brief reference to integrated strategies for dealing with drug abuse, drunk driving, and motor vehicle theft. Doubtless the descriptions have been tantalizing rather than convincing.

The meta-theory of dynamic and contextual response in this work is that there is no right or best policy for responding to a particular type of crime that can be revealed by positivist science. What is the best strategy depends on the history of other strategies that have succeeded or failed. I illustrated with the enforcement pyramid for Australian nursing home regulation: persuasion is a better strategy than deterrence until persuasion fails; deterrence is better than persuasion when the trust implied by persuasion has been abused; incapacitation is a better strategy than deterrence when deterrence has failed.

The idea of combining competing theories into integrated strategies is not just a matter of hedging bets—try one after the other until you find one that works. There should be a theory of integration that justifies an ordering of the strategies. For example, there are three grounds for trying persuasion before deterrence in the contexts I have mentioned:

1. Persuasion is cheaper.
2. Persuasion is more respecting of persons and of their freedom, being based on dialogue rather than coercion.
3. "Defiance" reactions that exacerbate crime (Sherman 1992) are more likely when deterrent threats are the port of first call.

Hence the idea of integrated strategies is a temporal sequencing that minimizes the weaknesses of each theory by covering them with the strengths of another. It follows that criminologists need to become theoretically eclectic rather than theoretically committed. The appreciative understanding that Bateson (1972) calls "systemic wisdom" comes from openness to playing with multiple theoretical metaphors. With such systemic wisdom, criminologists can "frame interventions that attempt to influence the pattern of relations defining a system, rather than attempting to manipulate artificial 'causes' and 'effects'" (Morgan 1986, p. 254). Criminological research can be reformed to inform the framing and reframing of such systemic interventions.

## NOTES

1. This article proceeds from the belief that most of the time it is a noble enterprise to be a criminologist and to seek to make a contribution to reducing crime, given the way most crimes

are defined in Western democracies. This is not to deny that there are ways of being a criminologist that are ignoble, that there are kinds of crime that one should not struggle to reduce, and that there are ways of doing it that are morally deplorable. My position on when and how it is good to be in the crime control game can be found elsewhere (Braithwaite and Pettit 1990).

2. See, for example, Vasquez (1990). But note that the papers in Section II of the collection, "Debates Over Methods and Theory," show that there is an embattled minority tradition in the field of positivist quantitative scholarship.

3. For example, reporting the truth of an insider trading practice on the stock market will cause other investors to adjust their behavior so that the insider trading is no longer profitable. The most lucrative criminal practices in any economy will be those whose truth has yet to be recognized, a truth that is therefore yet to be incorporated into criminological theory.

4. I am grateful for a conversation with Alfred Blumstein, which helped clarify my thinking on this issue.

5. Allison analyzed the Cuban crisis by, in turn, comprehending the players of this deadly game in terms of a rational actor model, an organizational process model, and a bureaucratic politics model.

6. See the important feminist study of the phenomenon by Hennessy (1993). Unfortunately for present purposes, this book is not primarily about the successful control strategies used to tackle the problem, but rather about the gendered promotion of the drug.

7. In speaking of criminological theories as supplying metaphors and positivist research as analogies, I don't want to be read as a postmodernist who doubts that truth and falsity can be found in the conclusions of theory and research. Even when they are true in the circumstances of their testing, they are still most productively viewed as metaphors and analogies when we attempt to apply them to a different context.

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